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Abstract

This paper examines the joint determinants of women's choice of work and
fertility within the Nash-bargaining framework using household survey data from
urban Tamil Nadu, India.
in a

The labor force participation decision is formulated
Alternative estimation

dichotomous and trichotomous choice framework.

methods are used to estimate the parameters of the wage and the choice of work
equations.

The empirical results show that women do not regard the decision to

participate in wage work as identical to self employment.

The trichotomous model

emerges as the preferred formulation of women's work decision.

The results

suggest that an increase in women's wage would draw more women into wage work and
self employment and concomitantly reduce fertility.

The neoclassical common

preference model of the family is rejected in the choice of work but not in the
fertility decisions.

The estimates of the wage equations indicate a private rate

of return to education of 13 percent for women and 11 percent for men.

KEY WORDS: Women' work, wages, fertility, India.
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Women's Choice of Work and Fertility in Urban Tamil Nadu, India

I.

Introduction:
A voluminous literature on labor supply in both developed and developing

countries has treated the number of children as an exogenous determinant of
women's

labor

Killingsworth

force

participation

1983, · Malathy

1991).

decision
In

(Heckman

contrast

to

1974,

these

Smith

studies,

1980,
a

vast

literature treats fertility as a choice variable (Becker 1960, Willis 1973,
T.W. Schultz 1974, and the studies reviewed in Schultz 1988b,1993).

Attempts

have also been made to model and estimate female labor supply and fertility in
a simultaneous equation framework (Cain and Dooley 1976, Schultz 1977, Fleisher
and Rhodes 1979). It·is increasingly recognized that identifying the underlying
structural relationships is difficult and empirical studies often use arbitrary
identifying

restrictions.

It

is

possible

to

estimate

the

simultaneous

relationship between labor supply and fertility only under special situations
such as the occurrence of twins as demonstrated in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980).
Hence, a number of studies estimate the joint determinants of labor supply and
fertility using a common set of exogenous variables and try to elucidate the
inherent association between these two variables (McCabe and Rosenzweig 1976,
Schultz 1990).

In this paper, I present estimates of the joint determinants of

labor force participation of women and fertility in the context of a developing
country namely India.
Most of the studies on women's labor supply have considered only the worknowork distinction.

This may be

appropriate

in the

context

of

developed

countries where women's participation in the informal or self employed activities
is low.

In the developing countries, in contrast, a large proportion of women

engage in occupations such as household industries,

family enterprises,

own
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farms, etc., which are characterized by flexibility of work hours, absence of
fixed costs of working etc.,.

Hence, the decision to enter the labor market as

a wage worker may be distinct from the decision to be self employed.

It is

important to understand the role of economic factors such as wages and income on
the choice of work - no work, wage work and self employment. 1
A small number of studies examine women's participation decision in formal
informal or wage work-self employment activities (Hill 1983, Behrman and Wolfe
1984,

Blau 1985, Vijverberg 1986, 1990, Rees and Shah 1986,Khandker 1987).

The

differences in these occupations not only affect the choice of occupation itself
but may

also

play

an

important

role

in fertility

decisions

because

the

informal/self employment sector is characterized, among other things, by the
compatibility of the job with

child care.

However, no attempt has been made to

study the joint determination of choice of work and fertility in the developing
country context.
High fertility and low level of female participation in labor market
activities are distinguishing characteristics of the Indian economy.

The

available evidence indicates that the crude worker to population ratio for urban
women has increased from 13.2 percent in 1972-73 to 15.3 percent in 1977-78 and
has remained more or less stable thereafter.

That is, the ratio is 14.9 and 15.2

percent in 1983 and 1987-88 respectively (Visaria and Minhas 1991). 2

The data

also suggest that the proportion of working women in self employed activities has
declined from 49.5 percent in 1977-78 to 45.8 percent in 1983.
period, the female share of

During the same

regular/salarie d and casual workers has increased

from 24.0 and 25.6 percent to 25.8 and 28.4 percent respectively (Sarvekshana
1988).

There has also been a steady decline in the total fertility rate between

1972 and 1988.

The total fertility rate has come down from 5.17 in 1972 to 4.2

3

in 1988 (World Bank, World Development Report (various issues).

We may infer

from the aggregate evidence that with the process of development, more women may
participate in the labor force and more of them may enter into wage work.

The

declining fertility, though by no means dramatic, may also be associated with the
changing productive roles of women.
It

would

be

instructive,

in

this

context,

determining women's choice of work and family size.
on

labor

supply

(Rosenzweig

1978,1980,1982,

to

examine

the

factors

The available Indian studies

Bardhan

1984)

and

fertility

(Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977, Rosenzweig 1982, Duraisamy 1988, Duraisamy and
Malathy 1991) are confined to rural areas.

No attempt has been made to study the

determinants of fertility of urban women.

In the earlier works, I have analyzedc

the labor supply behavior of urban women using a dichotomous (work, nowork) model
1989, 1991). 3

(Malathy 1983,

In this paper,

I also

study the trichotomous

choice of no work, wage work and self employment using a large and representative
household survey data for urban Tamil Nadu.
investigate

the

role

of

women's

status

Another concern of this paper is to
measured

by

women's

control

over

resources, on the choice of work and fertility using the Nash bargaining approach
(Manser and Brown 1979,1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, McElroy 1990).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
theoretical framework is presented in Section II.

A brief outline of the

In section III, the data,

empirical specification and estimation strategies are discussed.
provides the estimation results.

II.

Section IV

Section V summarizes the findings.

Theoretical Framework:
The household's decision regarding labor supply and demand for

services

are

usually

analyzed

within

a

neoclassical

household

maximization framework in the tradition of Becker (1965,1981).

child

utility

The individual's
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(husband or wife) preference over number of children (N), leisure of the wife
(Lw)

and a composite consumption commodity (C) can be represented as

(1)
where Ui is the utility function of the ith individual.

The children are

produced within the household using individual's time input (TNi), and market
purchased goods (X).
(2)

The production function for N can be specified as

N = N(X, TNi), i = h, w

The family is assumed to maximize the utility function subject to the production
function (2), the time constraint (3)
(3)

Ti = TNi + Li + Hi + Mi, i = h,w

where Ti is the total available time and Hand Mare the total time spent in
market work and housework respectively, and a budget constraint (4)
( 4)

PX = WhHh + Wwlfw + V

where Wi is the wage rate (i=h, w), and Vis the total family nonearned income.
The demand functions arising out the utility maximization process can be written
as
(5)

Dij = Dij(P, Ww, Wh, Vi ) , i = h, w; j = N, i.w, C
The indirect utility function based on the demand function (5) can be

written as
( 6)

v ij = Vj ( P , ww, wh , vi ) , j = N, Lw,

c;

i = h, w

The Nash-bargaining model assumes that partners co-operatively maximize the
product of the differences in each individual's utility from belonging to the
family (1) and a threat-point utility, the individual indirect utility (6), which
represents the utility to the individual if she/he quits the family union:
(7)

Tii[Ui(N, L, C;µ)-Vi(P,Ww, Wh)], i=h,w
The family demand function's arising out of the maximization process of (7)
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can be written as
(8) Yj = Yj (Pj, Ww, Wh, Vw, Vh; µ)
where j = C,H are the demand for number of children C, and His labor supply
(converse of leisure demand that is the argument in the welfare function); Ww,

Wh, Vw, and Vh are the wages and non-earned incomes of the wife and husband
respectively, and Pj is price of market goods.
The non-earned incomes Vi, i = w,h are individual specific and are assumed
to enhance the individual member's bargaining strength.

If the behavioral

effects of spouse specific non-earned income are identical,

then pooling of

family resources assumed in the common preference model can be accepted.

On the

other hand, if individual specific non-earned income exert different effects,
then this evidence favors the bargaining approach.

The equality of these effects

are tested empirically in. this study.

III. Date, Empirical Specification and Estimation Strategies:
The data source is the 1990-91 primary survey of urban households in Tamil
Nadu,

India,

conducted by me.

The survey was funded by a grant from the

Rockefeller Foundation Program at the Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
Tamil Nadu has a relatively large urban population of about 33 percent in
1981 which is much higher than the all India average of about 23 percent.
Further, the urban population in the state is spread among various size classes
of urban agglomerations and towns.
The first stage in the sampling process is the choice of districts for
which I have used the National Sample Survey classification of the entire state
into four agroclimatic regions, and randomly selected two districts from each
region.

The districts chosen as our study areas have urban population ranging

between 23 and 50 percent of the total population in the district.

Four of these
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districts are major urban agglomerations.
The second stage is the choice of towns from each district.

For this

purpose the towns in each district were classified according to population size
classes:

Class I towns with population of 100,000 and over, Class II with 50,000

to 100,000 population, and Class III with 20,000 to 50,000 population.

One town

from each population size class has been randomly selected.
In

selecting

the

households

from

classification of towns into divisions.
each

division,

handbooks.

and number

each

town,

I

used

the

census

The list of divisions, the streets in

of households

are

published

in

district

census

Ten percent of the divisions in each town has been taken and ten

households from each division were taken by a systematic sampling procedure.

A

household was included if it had at least one married couple with wife aged 1550.

Thus the sample size consist of 1276 husband-wife households.
The linear approximation of the demand functions

(8) for fertility and

labor supply can be specified as
= a'Z + e

(9)

N

(10)

Hw = fi'Z + u

where Z = [P, Ww, Wh, Vw, Vh, BJ is a vector of prices, wages, nonlabor income
and a set of control variables (B), and e and u denote the stochastic disturbance
terms. 4
The reduced form labor supply equation (10) denotes total labor supply
which is composed of the decision to participate in market work and the number
of hours conditional on participation.
of work equations can be specified as
(11)

P = 7'Z +

(12)

H* = 5'Z + c 2

£1

The participation and conditional hours

7

where H* is the hours of work conditional on participation,

E(Hi

H>O).

By

estimating equations ( 11) and ( 12) we can retrieve the implied total labor supply
parameters.
In the above participation equation, Pis usually defined as a dichotomous
variable taking the value of one if a woman participates (work)
market and zero if she does not work

(no work).

in the labor

This however imposes the

restriction that the woman views all types of work as the same.

As indicated

earlier, this is not true where the size of the self employed activities is
substantial and where these two sectors, wage work and self employment,

are

distinct due to flexible working hours and compatibility with child care in self
employment. ·
distinct

It is important to test whether the decision to participate -is•

from the decision to participate in wage work or

activities that is,

self employment

whether the trichotomous model simply collapses to the

dichotomous model.
The estimation strategy involves the following steps.

First, market wage

rates are estimated for men and women correcting for selectivity bias (Heckman
1974). Alternative wage imputation procedures are developed in the literature.
The widely used procedure consists of estimating participation in wage work and
wage equation by joint maximum likelihood methods.
the self employed and non workers alike.

However, this method treats

Another method is the extension of

Heckman (1976) procedure to control for possible selectivity due to labor force
participation and sectoral sorting decisions (Behrman and Wolfe 1984, Schultz
1990).

A problem with this method is that the two selection correction terms are

likely

to

be

collinear

selectivity problem.

and

could

yield

A third procedure

misleading
involves

conclusions

estimating a

about

the

trichotomous

participation decision model (nowork, wage work, self employment) and using the
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parameter estimates for selectivity correction in the wage equation for the
sample of wage workers.
Second, alternative specifications of the labor force model, namely the
dichotomous and the trichotomous models, are analyzed
multinomial legit models.

using probit, legit and

The specification test, namely log likelihood ratio

test, is applied to choose between the dichotomous and trichotomous legit models.
Third, the fertility decision of the women is analyzed.

The number of

children ever born equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares ( OLS) method. 5
Since women in the sample belong to different stages in the life cycle,

the

children ever born equations are re-estimated for three age cohorts - 20-29, 3039 and 40-49 to examine the different effect by age of woman.
The measurement of the endogenous and exogenous variables are discussed
below.

The description of the variables and their means and standard deviations

are given in Table 1.
The

dependent

variable,

labor

dichotomous and trichotomous variables.

force

participation,

is

defined

as

The participation dichotomous variable

takes the value of 1 if a woman participates in market work or self employment
activities and zero if she does not.

Additionally a dichotomous variable in wage

work is defined as a dummy taking the value of 1 if the women is a wage worker
and zero otherwise.

The trichotomous measure of the labor force participation

variable takes the value of O if she does not work, 1 if she is self employed and
2 if she is a wage worker.

The fertility variable is measured as children ever

born to a woman 20-50 years.
completed fertility.

This is a stock variable measuring cumulative or

Many women in the sample have not completed their fertility

and restricting analysis to older women reduces the sample size,
precision of

estimates,

and also entails

a

problem of

incorrect

lowers the
reporting

9

especially common to older women (Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1978).
this

problem and

to

include women who

have not

completed

To overcome

fertility,

some

researchers have included wife's age at marriage or duration of marriage as
conditioning variables.

But these variables are themselves endogenous and will

hence bias parameter estimates.

A second procedure is to adjust cumulative

fertility of incomplete families, as was done by Boulier and Rosenzweig (1978)
which considers the ratio of children ever born to the number a women could have
according

to

commences

immediately

adjustment

some

by

natural
after

estimating

fertility
marriage.

demand

biological supply function.

for

schedule,

assuming

Anderson
children

( 1983)

fertility
makes

constrained

by

control

a

biological

a

non-linear

This function itself is fit to the observed pattern

of fertility growth that is implied by cross-age sample and hence does not depend
on a natural fertility schedule which is itself an average measure derived on the
basis

of

another

country's

birth

rates.

I

have

not

attempted

any

such

. standardization in this study. However, I report estimates for three age cohorts
of women - less than
have different

29, 30-39, and 40-49 years.

impacts

different environments.

This permits the variables to

since women in different

age groups may

have faced

Additionally, such a stratification of the sample may

reduce biases arising from the incomparability of the fertility measures across
age cohorts.

Among the older women, who will have completed their fertility, the

estimates are easier to interpret.
The list of explanatory variables include wage rates, non earned income of
wife and husband, and wife's age.

Non-linearity in the effects of wages, non

earned income and wife's age are expected and interactions among the variables
are explored.
The wages of wife and husband are predicted from the regression estimates
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reported in Tables 2 and 3.

The own wage effect on labor force participation is

expected to be positive on the assumption that the substitution effect outweighs
the income effect.

The sign of husband's wage (cross wage) effect is expected

to be negative on wife's labor force participation (Killingsworth, 1983).

We may

expect the own and cross wages to have the same response in wage employment and
self employment as on labor force participation.

Whether more women would be

drawn into or out of wage work or self employment as the wage rates change cannot
be predicted and is an empirical question. The effects of wages of husband and
wife are expected to be negative on fertility on the assumption that children are
intensive

in

parents'

substitution effects.

and

time

the

income

effects

are

dominated

by

the

However, the effect of mother's wage would b§l larger.,.

(negative) than the father's wage since children are more intensive in mother's
time.
The non-earned income variables of the wife and husband are included
separately and are measured as the money (rupee) value of the total stock of
assets held individually by them.

It is generally expected that the pure income

effect due to an increase in assets will reduce labor supply (increase leisure
which is a normal good), and increase the demand for children if children are
However, the response of woman's labor supply and

assumed to be a normal good.

fertility to the asset variable may be systematically different depending on who
owns the assets.
negative

on

labor

The responsiveness to increases in her wealth may be more
supply

and

more

positive

on

child

services

than

the

responsiveness to an increase in her husband's assets.
Age of wife is included to capture the cohort effect and as a
biological adjustment factor.
include a squared term in age.

sample

To allow for non-linear effects of age, I also
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V.

Empirical Results:

A.

Estimates of Wage Equations:
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the sample selection corrected wage

equations for women and men respectively.

In both the tables,

column (1)

presents the estimates of reduced form participation equation and column 2 and
3 are the joint Maximum likelihood estimates of the wage work status and log
hourly wage equations.

The dual selection correction terms computed from the

participation and wage work equations are introduced in the Heckman two step
method in column 4.

Columns 5 and 6 present the multinomial logit estimates of

self employment and wage work status and the selection correction term from the
wage work parameter estimates is introduced in the wage equation given in the
last column.

The reduced form dichotomous and trichomotous participation

parameter estimates given in columns 1,2,5 and 6 show that all the variables
significantly affect the probability that a woman would participate in market
work and be in the wage sector but not being self employed. More schooling and
experience (defined as age minus schooling minus six) significantly increase the
returns from market relative to non-market activities and is strongly associated
with working and being a wage worker. The income effect operating through the
spouse specific asset coefficients reduce the likelihood of working and also
entering the wage sector. The corresponding estimates for men are reported in
table 3. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of equal asset effect at 5
percent level of significance only in the equations for women. A likelihood ratio
test is performed on the dichotomous versus the trichotomous model.

The reported

x 2 test statistics with 7 degrees of freedom is 68.56 and is significant at the
1 percent level,

indicating that the trichotomous model is preferred to the

dichotomous model for women.

Men's labor force behavior 'is also preferably
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represented by the trichotomous model for which the relevant x 2 test statistic
is 66.12.
The parameter estimates of the semi logarithmic wage equations show that
wage increases with education and increases at a decreasing rate with experience
for both women and men.

Both education and experience coefficients

are

statistically significant at 1 percent level for women and men except the
experience squared terms in the equation with the double selection terms.

The

private rate return to education of women is 13 percent and 11 percent for men.
This finding of higher returns to women's education is found in several other
developing countries such as Indonesia, Columbia, Brazil, Taiwan, India (Andhra
Pradesh), and Ivory Coast (Schultz, 1988a).
The joint maximum likelihood prob it and multinomial lo git estimates given
in columns 3 and 7 show that the selectivity bias is important for women but not
for men.

The estimated rho, which represents the correlation between the error

terms of the probit and the log wage equation, is positive and significantly
different from zero for women but not for men.

This implies that estimating the

wage equations on a selective sample of workers would yield biased estimates for
women.

The double selection correction terms are not statistically significant

for women, probably due to the high correlation.

However, the selection term on

wage earner status is statistically significant for males.

The education and

experience coefficients are stable across specifications for women but not for
men for whom the double selection correction increases the returns to education
and reduces the returns to experience.
B.

Estimates of Labor Force Participation and Choice of Work Equations :
Table 4, presents the estimates of the labor force participation equations

for

women.

Even

though

the

trichotomous

model

emerges

as

the

preferred

13
estimates of the dichotomous models are also presented for

formulation,

comparison. Columns 1 and 2 provide the probit estimates of the dichotomous
characterization of labor force participation and participation in wage work. The
corresponding

partial

coefficients.

The predicted log hourly wages obtained from the estimates given

derivatives

are

provided

in

brackets

below

in tables 2 and 3 are correlated with the assets and wife's age variables.

the

The

predicted log hourly wage are converted into hourly wage and used in the women's
work and fertility equations.

This considerably improve significance of the

effects assets and women's age variables.
The results are as expected and in line with those reported in the
literature.

The own wage has a positive effect and the cross wage has a negative

effect on both measures of labor force participation.

Both wife's and husband's

assets significantly reduce the probability of participation.
performed to test the equality of the asset coefficients.

The

The Wald test is
null hypothesis

of equality is rejected at the 5 percent level of confidence or better where the

x 2 statistics is 22.07 and 5.23 with 1 degree of freedom, respectively in the
participation and wage work equations.
The parameter estimates of the trichotomous logit model of women's choice
of work and their corresponding marginal values are presented in columns 3 and
4 of Table 4.

A likelihood ratio is computed to test whether the women's work

choice is dichotomous or trichotomous.

The Chi-square test statistics of 63.46

with 7 degrees of freedom is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
This implies that the trichotomous formulation of women's choice of work is more
appropriate.

Women's wage exhibits a positive relationship with the likelihood

of participating in both wage employment and self employment.

However, as the

own wage increases the probability of entering into wage work is higher than
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being self employed implying that women with high wages are more attracted to the
formal sector of the labor market.

An increase in the husband's wage reduces

more the probability of participation in wage work than in self employment.
seems

reasonable

housework.

considering that

This

self employment may be compatible with

The implied own wage and cross wage

elasticities are 0.42 and 0.39

for self employed women and 0.56 and 0.40 respectively for wage workers. The
income effects exerted through the asset coefficients suggest that as assets
increase, irrespective of who owns it, women tend to be less likely to be a labor
market participant and the negative effect comes through significantly only in
the wage earner equation. The pattern of the asset coefficients suggest that the
women's

own asset

exerts

a bigger work reducing effect.

The Wald

test

statistics, given in the last row of table 4, rejects the null hypothesis that
the effect of assets of husband and wife are equal. 6
C.

Estimates of Fertility Equations:
Table 5 provides the OLS regression estimates of the fertility equation.

Column 2 presents the estimates including the quadratic terms in the asset
variables. An increase in the wage of husband and wife reduces the demand for
number of children ever born, but the effect is much larger for the wife's wage.
This suggests that child care is a more mother's time intensive commodity and is
perceived as a cost of bearing and rearing children.

The computed own and cross

wage elasticities are 0.273 and 0.126 respectively. Earlier we observed that
female wages have a positive effect on labor force participation and choice of
wage or self employment work.

This suggests that as the attractiveness of a job

(whether inside the home as a family worker or outside as a wage worker)
increases, other things remaining the same, there will be a decline in birth
rates.

An increase in women's wage is associated with a reallocation of women's
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time to market work and especially,to wage work, with a concomitant reduction in
fertility.
The income effects are positive and in line with a priori prediction but
are significant only in the specification including the squared terms in assets.
This suggests that child services are normal goods.

Our results indicate that

women's assets are associated with a bigger positive demand for children compared
to her husband's assets.

In addition to viewing children as a normal good women

may consider children also as a productive investment as a potential source of
support in sickness or old age. The test of equality of asset effect is not
rejected at

any

conventional

level

of

significance

and

implies

distribution of the ownership of nonearned income between the
irrelevant for fertility decisions.

that

the

spouses

is

Interestingly, Schultz(l990) and Thomas

(1990), reject the income pooling hypothesis in fertility decisions in Thailand
and Brazil where women's assets exert a larger positive effect than men's assets.
The OLS estimates of the fertility equations by age cohorts of women are
presented in Table 6. For the oldest cohort of women the measured fertility
corresponds to the completed fertility implied by the definition of children ever
born. If women in the middle cohort 30-39 years stop having children by age 39,
then for this sample current fertility also corresponds to their completed
fertility. There is a remarkable consistency in the statistically significant
fertility reducing effect of women's own wage across the three age cohorts.

The

effect is largest among the oldest age group namely women aged 40-49 years.

The

women's asset effect is statistically significant only among the middle age
cohorts while the husband's asset effect is significant and positive only among
the youngest age group, and suggests assets relax the credit restraint effect on
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starting childbearing, but not an effect on the completed lifetime number of
births.

V. Conclusions
This paper presents estimates of the joint determinants of women's choice
of work and fertility in the context of urban Tamil Nadu, India.

Women's choice

of work is formulated in a dichotomous and trichotomous framework.

The results

confirm that women in urban Tamil Nadu do not regard the decision to engage in
wage work as identical to self employment. The empirical results suggest that,
in general, wife's wage increases the probability of participation more in wage
•employment

compared to self employment.

An increase in husband's wage is

associated with a reduction in the wife's probability of participation in both
wage employment and self employment. The positive effect of the own wage however
exceeds

the

employment.

participation

reducing

effect

of

the

husband's

wage

in

wage

A 10 percent increase in the wage of wife would increase the woman's

participation in self employment by 4 percent and in wage work by 6 percent.

A

similar increase in her spouse's wage leads to a reduction in her participation
in both self employment and wage work by 4 percent.

Both husband's and wife's

wage significantly reduce the demand for children. A ten percent increase in
wife's and husband's wage rates
percent respectively.

leads to a reduction in fertility by 3 and 1

The results imply that with development and a general

growth in wage of women, more women would be drawn into wage work compared to
self employment and fertility would decline.

The assets owned by the women exert

a distinct and significant negative effect on participation in wage work and
positive effect on fertility.
the

labor

The equality of asset effects is rejected in all

force participation and choice of work equations but not

in the

fertility equations. This implies that women with more bargaining power prefer
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to consume more leisure but the distribution of assets does not have any impact
on fertility.
Experiments with alternative procedures to correct for sample selection
bias found that the multinomial logit model seems to be appropriate since the
choice decision is trichotomous rather than dichotomous.

The estimates of the

wage equations indicate a private of returns to education of 13 percent and 11
percent respectively for men and women.
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Footnotes
1. Japan is an exception among the developed countries. See Hill (1983) for an
analysis of the women's participation in the informal sector.
2. The data are from the various quinquennial surveys on employment and
unemployment conducted by the National Sample survey Organization (NSSO). From
1972-73, the NSSO has maintained comparable and consistent definition of workers.
It should be noted that the worker population ratio is computed population of all
ages which includes children and aged dependents.
3. Malathy ( 1989) estimates the parameters of the labor supply function
correcting for endogeneity of children. Location of residence before marriage,
number of rooms in the house and religion are used as identifying variables.
However, these turn out to be not statistically significant.
4. The demand functions includes price of goods as an exogenous variable. As the
households face same price in a cross section data like ours, the price variables
are not included in the regressions.
5. The .dependent var.iable is discrete and takes nonnegative integer values. To,-.
take into account this nature of the dependent variable, a poisson model is
applied. The sign and significance of the parameter estimates are similar to the
OLS results. However, the pois son model is more appropriate for shorter constant
In that case it captures the more
period of about 5 years before the survey.
recent pattern of fertility (see Schultz, 1992). In our sample about two-thirds
For this
of the women report no children ever born in the last 5 years.
definition of the dependent variable, most of the explanatory variables turn out
I also tried to apply the ordered probit model since it
to be insignificant.
takes into account the right censoring, as many women have still not completed
fertility. The sign and significance of the ordered probit estimates are similar
to the OLS estimates reported in the text. Hence the ordered probit estimates
are not reported.
6. Squared terms in the asset variables were introduced but they turned out to
be not statistically significant.
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Table 1
Variable Description, Means and Standard Deviations

Mean

Variable

Standard
Deviation

Endogenous Variable
Labor Force Participation
Wife participation (dichotomous)
Wife wage work

(dichotomous)

Wife self employed (dichotomous)

0.300

0.459

0.163

0.370

0.137

0.344

Husband

participation (dichotomous)

0.925

0.264

Husband

wage work

(dichotomous)

0.582

0.493

0.342

0.474

3.125

1.515

Wife's hourly wage (predicted)

4.915

3.009

Husband's hourly wage (predicted)

9.486

4.388

Wife's education (in years)

5.761

4.694

Husband's education (in years)

9.082

4.644

16.470

19.623

Husband's assets ( in 1000 rupees)

50.863

68.954

Wife's age

(in years)

36.066

8.080

Husband's age

( in years)

42.735

8.453

Wife's experience(age-education-5)

25.306

9.741

Husband's experience (age - education - 5)

28.653

10.038

Husband self employed (dichotomous)
Fertility
Number of children ever born

Exogenous Variables:

Wife's assets

Sample size

(in 1000 rupees)

1276
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Table 2
Reduced Form Labor Force Participation and Wage Equations Estimates for Women

Parti
-cipate

ln(hourly) ln(hourly)
wage
wage

Wage
Earner

(Probit)
1

2

Constant

-1.254
(4.87)a

-2.232
(6.84)

-.786
(2.18)

-0.918
(0.95)b

Wife's education

.0706
(7.10)

0.112
(9.06)

0.133
(10.83)

Wife's experience

• 0607 .
(3.15)

0.0708
(2.97)

Experience square

-.00136
(3.56)

-0.00114
(2.37)

Husband's assets
(Xl0-3 )

-.00166
(2.20)

-0.00445
(3.22)

Wife's assets
(Xl0-3 )

- • 0112
(4.38)

-0.0198
(4.70)

Self
Employed

(OLS with A)

(MLE)

3

4

Wage ln(hourly)
Wage
Earner
(OLS with i..)

(Mlogit)
5

6

-1.720
(3.00)

-3.638
(6.66)

(7 .09)

.0288
( 1. 30)

.209
(9.16)

0.0724
(4.89)

0.0770
(2.27)

.0620
(1.41)

0.127
(3.18)

-0.000714
(2.24)

-0.000857 -.00214
(0.85)
(2.39)

0.135

-.0000181
(-.01)
-.008205
( 1. 65)

Lambda (Wage
Earner status)

0.252
(0.15)

Lambda
(Participate)

0.0839
(0.11)

7

-. 777
(2.85)b
.133
(16.23)
.0715
(5.85)

-0.00223 -.000695
(2.71)
(2.81)
-0.00767
(3.68)
-0.0388
(5.01)

.202
(2.13)

• 371

Sigma

(7. 68)

Rho

Log likelihood

.540
(2.21)
-715. 54

LR Test: Dichotomous
Versus Trichotomous(x 72 )
Test of equality of
asset effect (x 12 ) 10.98

-551.45

-945.34

68.56
12.56

a. Asymptotic 't' values in parentheses
b. Absolute ' t ' values in parentheses

2.180

13.80
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Table 3
Reduced Form Labor Force Participa tion and Wage Equations Estimates for Men
Parti
-cipate

Wage
Earner

(Probit)
1

Constant

2.327
(5.79)a

ln(hourly ) ln(hourly ) Self
Wage
Wage
Employed
(OLS with A)

(MLE)

2

3

4

Wage
Earner

(Mlogit)
5

ln(hourly )
Wage
(OLS with A}

6

7

-.0836
(-.28)

-.0568
(-.38)

-0.0787
(0.52)b

4.357
(4.93)

4.013
(4.85)

.0531
.345)

Husband's education -0 .107
(7 .04)

.205
(2.16)

.110
(7.65)

0.138
(3.80)

-.273
(8.21)

-.190
(6.07)

.1095
(8.11)

Husband's experienc e 0.0526
(2.13)

.192
(1.01)

.0578
(8.34)

0.0421
(4.50)

.0673
(1.29)

.0856
(1. 77)

.0569
(7.37)

-.000548 -0.000170 -.00243
(4.58)
(0.92)
(2.69)

-.00233
(2.78)

-.000539
(4.13)

Experienc e square

-.00138 -.000208
(3.21)
(-.65)

Husband's assets

-.000601 -.00338
(.83)
(5.38)

.00123
(. 82)

-.00446
(2.71)

.00136 -.00494
(.46)
(2.56)

.00936
(1.57)

-.00089
(-.14)

(xl0-3)

Wife's assets
(xl0-3)

-1.151
(2.94)

Lambda (Wage
Earner status)

0.144
(1.30)

Lambda
(Particip ate)
Sigma

0.416
(2.75)

Rho

.210
(0.76)

Log Likelihoo d

-.0428
(-.406)

-309.56

LR Test: Dichotomo us
Versus Trichotom ous(x 7 2 )
Test of equality of
asset effect (x 12 ) 0.40

-1234.7

-1051. 1

66.12
0.59

a. Absolute (Asymptot ic) ' t ' values in parenthes es
b. Absolute ' t ' values in parenthes es

0.51

0.73
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Table 4
Estimates of Labor Force Participatio n of Women

Constant

Parti
-cipate
(Probit)

Wage
Earner
(Probit)

1

2

Multinomial Legit
Self Emp.
3

Wage earner
4

-2.504
(-2.40)a
[-0.700]b

-0.844
(-0.62)
[-0.040]

-5.276
(-2.57)
[-0.385]

(-2.11)

Wage of wifec

0.687
(18.39)
[0.192]

1.026
(15.82)
[0.049]

1.098
(13.53)
[0.0781]

1.202
(14.90)
[0.0802]

Wage of Husbandc

-0.0502
(-9.43)
[-0.014]

-0.424
(-12.03)
[-0.020]

-0.664
(-11.99)
[-0.0480]

-0.620
(-12.31)
[-0.0407]

-.0214
(-6.09)
[-0.00599]

-.0284
(-4.60)
[-0.00136]

-.00909
(-1. 56)
(-0.000457]

-.0379
(-4.34)
[-0.00270]

-.00296
(-2.95)
[-0.000827)

-.0124
(-5.59)
[-0.000589]

Wife's assets
(xl0-3)

Husband's assets
(xl0-3)

Wife's age

Wife's age square

0.107
(1. 74)
[0.030]
-0.00271
(-3.07)
(-0.00760]

Log likelihood
-408.97
LR Test: Dichotomous
Versus Trichotomou s(x 2 )
7
Test of equality of
asset effect (x 12 ) 22.07

0.0376
(0.48)
[0.00179]

-4.357
[-0.282]

.000331
(.19)
[0.0000889]
.373
(3.03)
[0.0274]

-.00144
-.00689
(-1.30)
(-3.87)
(-0.000068] [-0.000508]
-217.69

-.00921
(-3.64)
[-0.000675]
.2735
(2.29)
[0.174)
-.00497
-2.97)
[-0.000316]

-736.08
63.46

5.23

a. Asymptotic ' t ' values in parentheses
b. Marginal values in brackets.
c. Predicted values (see text for explanation ).

2.02

8.76
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Table 5
Regression Estimates of Fertility Equations
OLS
1

2.

Constant

-3.229
(-4.59)a

Wage of Wifeb

-0.174
(-9.96)

Wage of Husbandb

-0.0451
(-3.78)

-0.0435
(-3.65)

0.00309
(1.68)

0.00848
(2.20)

Wife's assets
(xl0-3)
Wife's assets square
(xl0-10)
Husband's assets
(xl0-3)

0.000894
(1. 71)

x2/ ~
Tests of Equalit
asset effects (X

2

of
/F)

0.000223
(2.62)
-0.0327
(-2.16)

0.312
(7.71)

Wife's age square

-0.178
(-10.15)

-0.657
(-1. 77)

Husband's assets square
(xl0-10)
Wife's age

-3.241
(-4.62)

0.307
(7.60)

-0.00272
(-4.88)

-0.00264
(-4.74)

.366

.366

1.122

1.417

a. ' t ' values in parentheses
b. Predicted values (see text for explanation).
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Table 6
by Age Group

OLS Estimates of Fertility Equations

2.181
(0.25)a

Constant

1

2

1

Age 40-49

Age 30-39

Age 20-29

2

1

2

1.899
(0.46)

-2.519
(-0.29)

-2.897
(-0.34)

-40.879
(-2.67)

-42.035
(-2.76)

Wage of Wifeb

-0.250
(-6.33)

-0.2534
(-6.36)

-0.210
(-6.05)

-0.208
(-5.98)

-0.168
(-6.59)

-0.173
(-6.76)

Wage of Husbandb

-0.0607
(-2.63)

-0.0584
(-2.51)

-0.0596
(-2.84)

-0.0612
(-2.91)

-0.0284
(-1.52)

-0.0263
(-1.41)

Wife's assets

0.00389
(1.50)

0.00225
(0.434

0.00765
(2.42)

0.0143
(2.28)

0.000159
(0.05)

o. 0111
(1.50)

(xl0-3)

(xl0-10)

Husband's assets
(x10·3 )

0.00259
(2.65)

0.00485
(2.22)

0.000228
(0.25)

(xl0-10)

Wife's age

-0.174
(-0.53)

Wife's age square

-0.00837
(-1.28)

0.154
(-0.47)
0.00799
(1.22)

0.000863 0.000607
(0.73)
(0.55)

0.303
(0.61)
-0.00292
(-0.40)

0.321
(0.64)

0.00196
( 1. 34)
-0.0275
(-1.26)

-0.0232
(-0.65)

-0.11368
(-1.14)

Husband's assets sq.

-11. 192
(-1.73)

-0.824
(-1.31)

-0.142
(-0.28)

Wife's assets square

2.035
(2.96)

-0.00319 -0.0224
(-2.91)
(-0.44)

2.079
(3.03)
-0.0228
(-2.98)

-R 2

0.404

0.403

.234

.235

Test of Equality
of asset effects(F)

0.178

0.124

4.307

2.079

0.0154

1.598

350

350

438

438

488

488

Sample Size

a. 't, values in parentheses
b. Predicted values (see text for explanation).

.209

.214

